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Abstract
The argument put forward in this paper is that ecopsychology would
benefit from engaging in more dialogue with developments in the
social sciences. The benefits are predominantly in terms of enriching
ecopsychological understandings of how we might encourage con-
nectedness to nature and environmental advocacy and discourage
environmentally distructive behaviors. More particularly, recent
work in the social sciences asserts that existing models of behavior
are unlikely to lead to changes on the scale necessary to create
something akin to genuinely sustainable societies. The article draws
on theory and research emphasizing the irreducible relationship
between the psychological and the social, as a basis for better
understanding the apparent obstinacy of environmentally destructive
behavior and for interventions that offer the hope of change.
. any attempt to develop a sustainable society has to understand
how the relationships between individuals and their social con-
texts can be changed. (Uzzell & Ra¨thzel, 2009, p. 340)
T
here have been numerous recent attempts to comprehen-
sively survey dominant themes in ecopsychology and
related psychologies of the environment (e.g., Paidas, 2011;
Thompson, 2009). These reviews provide an invaluable
guide to how human and nonhuman nature relationships, including
those at the core of ecological degradation, are understood across a
broad disciplinary base. However, this article looks beyond psy-
chology to developments elsewhere in the social sciences. It is argued
that we find there a rapidly developing account of topics relevant to
ecopsychologists, not least novel conceptualizations of the role of
human behavior and experience in environmental problems and
solutions. The paper offers brief outlines of various attempts to
theorize social practices as a basic unit of analysis, rather than in-
dividual behavior, and related implications for bringing about ef-
fective personal and social change in the direction of sustainability.
In conclusion, it is argued that ecopsychology can benefit by en-
gaging with contemporary conceptualizations of the way the social is
mutually implicated in individual behavior and experience.
The Psychological and the Social
Ecopsychology is concerned with the psychic and emotional as-
pects of human-nonhuman nature connectedness and ecological
degradation, and to some extent the social dimensions, particularly
when this relationship is problematized in terms of environmental
crisis. In fact, foundational work in ecopsychology has conceptual-
ized the interplay of aspects of sociocultural infrastructure and norms
with the personal and subjective, emphasizing the cultural patholo-
gies underpinning environmentally destructive behaviors (Kidner,
2001; Roszak, 1992). By contrast, it is argued that sociology and
social theory has only belatedly contributed to an attempt to un-
derstand the role of human behavior in both reproducing and po-
tentially overcoming environmental crisis (Kasper, 2009; Shove,
2010). However, a substantial level of theory and research is now
emerging in these fields that significantly overlaps with ecopsy-
chological concerns (e.g., Beck, 2010; Davis, 2010; Jackson, 2008;
Kasper, 2009; Lertzman, 2012; Shove, 2010). This work arguably
extends our understanding of the social dimension of human-non-
human nature connectedness and ecological degradation. Perhaps
more importantly, there is renewed interest in the psychosocial,
where the interplay of the social and psychological or ‘‘the
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interconnectedness of society and the psyche’’ (Cavalletto, 2007, p. 4)
is granted primary ontological status, rather than one being a poor
cousin of the other in some form. Although a comprehensive summary
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to identify some de-
velopments in the literature that amount to a critical consensus of sorts.
This consensus may provide the basis for further dialogue between
ecopsychology, sociology, psychosocial theory, and social theory.
A key claim in this developing literature is that social context has
been undertheorized and researched in psychological work on en-
vironmental problems and solutions, resulting in individualistic
understanding of human practices and misguided policy inter-
ventions assuming people behave as rational agents (e.g., Szers-
zynski & Urry, 2010, p. 3). This is something of a caricature of
conceptualizations of the social world in psychologies of the en-
vironment. The psychological mainstream, as far as it is distin-
guishable, also now acknowledges that psychological research
needs to provide a much more nuanced understanding of the
multiple and interdependent behavioral decisions involved in
patterns of consumption and environmental destruction, even if
government policy is slow to catch up (Webb, 2012). However,
common practice subsequent to this tends to acknowledge social/
cultural factors as ‘‘variables’’ in mapping ‘‘drivers’’ of human be-
havior, with the individual as the prime unit of analysis (Steg and
Vlek, 2009; Swim et al., 2011).
The failure to fully engage with the social here perhaps reflects a
broader historical ‘‘hesitancy,’’ particularly in American psychology
(Fiske, 2012). As to the reasons why, it may be that established
psychology has simply reflected the individualism inherent in the
dominant social paradigm of Western modernity (Kidner, 2001).
Beyond this possibility, we can only speculate, along with Fiske, that
to psychologists the social can seem too ‘‘unwieldy, too macro; others
because it seems too correlational or descriptive, not enough ex-
perimental control’’ (2012, p. 6).
Uzzell and Ra¨thzel admonish psychology, and even social psy-
chology, for forwarding ‘‘individualistic and reductionist models of
behavior which have rarely positioned behavior within its larger
social, economic and political context’’ (2009, p. 341). Surprisingly,
their argument appears at the heart of the Journal of Environmental
Psychology, long considered the voice of the more cautious older
sibling to ecopsychology (e.g., Reser, 1995). In developing their ar-
gument, Uzzell and Ra¨thzel advocate a ‘‘transformative environ-
mental psychology’’ and related education program (see also Ra¨thzel
& Uzzell, 2009). Transformative environmental psychology is evoked
as a way of progressing a ‘‘strong’’ sustainable agenda via a shift in
emphasis. The shift is away from an attempt to map, predict, and
shape even the widest range or most careful separation of individual
attitudes, behaviors, and choices toward an understanding of the
individual in context, addressing ‘‘specific cultural contexts as well
as [the] broader consumerist societal context’’ (p. 432).
Conceptualizing Psychosocial Practices
Recent social theory and environmental psychology suggest that
what is required instead is a very particular understanding of where
the social meets the psychic, the basic unit of psychosocial analysis,
as practice (Hand et al., 2005; Shove, 2003, 2010; Webb, 2012). To be
understood as the basic unit of analysis, practices have been framed
by social and cultural theorists as conveyors of significant symbolic
and cultural meanings. These meanings do not originate with indi-
viduals but are embodred in individual performances (Law and Urry,
2004). Reckivitz (cited in Warde, 2004, p. 134) defines practices in
that sense as follows:
Thus, she or he is not only a carrier of patterns of bodily be-
haviour, but also of certain routinized ways of understanding,
knowing how and desiring. These conventionalized ‘‘mental’’
activities of understanding, knowing how and desiring are nec-
essary elements and qualities of a practice in which the single
individual participates, not qualities of the individual.
Ordinary and habitual practices are social in that they follow
routines devised from convention—taken-for-granted stocks of
knowledge that reveal culture-specific learning: people are creatures
of social routine and habit and of fashion and fad (Goffman, 1967):
‘‘These patterns of routine and fashion stem from how people are
locked into and reproduce many different kinds of social institutions,
both old and new’’ (Szerszynski & Urry, 2010, p. 3). Institutions cited
in this context include families, households, class, gender, work,
school, ethnicity, age, nation, scientific communities, NGOs, and
broader cultural worldviews and technological systems ‘‘that shape
people’s sense of what is permissible, desirable and possible’’
(Szerszynski & Urry, 2010, p. 3).
Practices are also conceptualized as social in that they are fun-
damentally relational; that is, they are realized in relation to, and in
conjunction with, real and imagined others. An emphasis on sociality
is clear in Uzzell and Ra¨thzel’s advocacy of a ‘‘transactionalist’’
perspective. It explicitly recognizes that individual and external
worlds are permeable, linked in complex andmutual ways, which can
only be treated as interrelated phenomenon. Reciprocity and per-
meability becomes the unit of analysis, where the individual, the
social group, or the setting can only be defined with reference to the
others. The environment embodies the psychologies and the social
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relations of those who live in it. It confers meaning, promotes
identity, and locates the person socially, culturally and economically.
The primacy of social practices shifts attention away from a focus
on the individual and, say, his or her connectedness to nature,
and toward the relationship between everyday practices and the
opportunities, validations, norms, and so on they create around
‘‘connecting to nature’’ as a possible performance, and actual op-
portunities for affective bodies resonating with nature (Kidner, 2001).
Consider how this emphasis frames an activity such as consumption,
or more specifically its entrenchment as a way of life in consumerism.
Consumerism is understood as a symbolic activity providing em-
bodied meaning in the pursuit of pleasure, however fleeting, prob-
lematic, and partial this pleasure might be. And norms of
consumption are formulated in the constant relational work of val-
idating (or repudiating) social narratives, practices, and perfor-
mances associated with consumption.
If we accept it is a set of practices in reciprocal relation via which
particular ways of life are constituted, where does it leave the search
for solutions to environmental problems? In the most basic terms, if
the consumption-oriented social practices that coalesce in a con-
sumer society perform the ‘‘vital sociological role’’ of creating and
maintaining a meaningful social world, psychological work focusing
on the internal or structural ‘‘barriers’’ to sustainable consumption
and a normative critique of consumption misses the point. When
applied to environmentally sustainable or destructive behavior, the
implications for social scientific understanding are deceptively
simple: ‘‘the majority of environmentally significant consumption is
undertaken not for its own sake but as part of the ordinary accom-
plishment of everyday life’’ (Shove, 2010, p. 282;Warde, 2005). There
is a therefore a call for ‘‘concerted effort to conceptualize the relative
fluidity and fixity of what have come to be ordinary, but ultimately
untenable, ways of life’’ (Shove, 2010, p. 283).
An emphasis on individual practices as reciprocally embedded in
social and relational contexts now amounts to what I will call an
emerging ‘‘critical consensus,’’ at least among those of us frustrated
with limited economic and individualist models of behavior change
(Webb, 2012). This shift reframes how we think about ‘‘barriers’’ to
sustainable behaviors, and related understandings of the individual.
It moves beyond the discourses of behavior change and in doing so
forces a rethink of how central cultural patterns of meaning and
supportive social structures are to the validation of practices con-
sidered problematic in the context of a ‘‘strong’’ sustainability
agenda: ‘‘it is important to tackle the cultural as well as the societal
structures that support such practices if one wants to achieve be-
haviour change’’ (Uzzell and Ra¨thzel, 2009, p. 341).
A parallel concern is surely a consideration of what kinds of cul-
tural and social constellations support and validate alternative
practices, either potential or existing (Kingsnorth & Hine, 2009).
Rather than asking questions about individual behavior and attitude,
we must ask how we might engender ‘‘circumstances which could
enable subordinated or shadow understandings to develop substan-
tively, to be acknowledged and to be acted on systematically’’ (Webb,
2012, p. 122). In this light, purposeful interventions, including those
carried out in the name of psychology, will benefit from incorpo-
rating psychosocial perspectives, as they gain more prominence in
academic research, public debate, and policy making (Cavalletto,
2007)—resourcing communities, projects, and research that make
alternative networks of meaning and pleasure viable (e.g., Kasper,
2008; Schneider and Miller, 2011).
The intention here is not to downplay how much of an obstacle to
change ‘‘our’’ (as in wealthier inhabitants of consumer societies)
embroilment in the obdurate social and cultural norms of consumer
capitalism pose, nor is it to suggest that the ongoing adversities that
afflict so many across the globe can be magically lifted via an appeal
to alternative practices. Clearly this all gets in the way of the for-
mation of alternative networks and practices; social practices do not
emerge from a vacuum. That said, alternative practices must, and do,
emerge from existing social and psychological realties, however
extensive the colonization of affect (Kidner, 2001); and they have
transformative potential. A great deal of recent work across the dis-
ciplines has attempted to conceptualize alternatives, even if they are
often described with necessary ambiguity as ‘‘shadows’’ (Webb, 2012),
‘‘cracks’’ (Holloway, 2010) or ‘‘surplus affect’’ (Lertzman, 2012, p. 99).
It is possible to begin to flesh out the ‘‘assemblages of social
practices’’ that could, or already do, constitute successful sustainable
lifestyles. For some this is in fact an urgent imperative: ‘‘to raise our
imaginations to the challenge of the Anthropocene, we must be able
to envision alternative configurations of agents, practices and social
relations’’ (Davis, 2010, p. 44). A range of work engages in articu-
lating and advocating alternative practices more fully: Kate Soper’s
conceptualization of alternative hedonism, an explicit attempt to
consider the joined-up pleasures of less consumption and noncon-
sumption and how such practices might gain broader cultural vali-
dation (Soper, 2007; Soper et al., 2009); Tim Jackson’s similar
emphasis on the ‘‘gains’’ of sustainable lifestyles (2008); Ulrich Beck’s
optimistic account of a ‘‘green modernity’’ (2010); Paul Kingsnorth
and Dougland Hine’s call to radically reformulate the ‘‘narratives we
live by’’ (2010). More familiar might be Andy Fisher’s call to radi-
calize ecopsychology and his emphasis on ‘‘recollective practices’’
(2002), and the practice and study of alternative communities such as
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transition towns (Chatterton & Cutler, 2008) and ecovillages (Kasper,
2008, 2009).
Despite their differences, these studies share an attempt to artic-
ulate human activity as a space of practices invested with affect, in
dynamic relationship with others, implicitly or explicitly embedding
practices in social and cultural networks of validation, as vital to an
understanding of environmental problems and solutions. The next
section will attempt to flesh out how an understanding of social
practices has been developed in recent work by Deborah Kasper and
will consider how her work may be of relevance to ecopsychology.
Ecological Habitus
Kasper makes the now-familiar argument that the epistemological
underpinnings of much research into the human and nonhuman
nature relationship reflect ‘‘an enduring modernWestern worldview’’
rooted in dualistic and mechanist understandings of human behavior
in which ‘‘a person is viewed as a discrete entity set in opposition to
an external world’’ (2009, p. 3). Behavior from this perspective has no
reciprocal influence on cause—this level of interrelation introduces
too much complexity and uncertainty into the model. But the re-
ciprocal nature of interrelated processes is the norm for the emerging
psychosocial models discussed above, and Kasper advances some-
thing similar. Social life is not a ‘‘series of changes brought about in
static states by the reactions of dependent variables to independent
variables but.an ongoing process always embedded in interdepen-
dent relations’’ (Kasper, 2009, p. 4; emphasis in the original).
Kasper’s discussion then draws on the themes we have identified
above in arguing for a ‘‘Relational Process Approach.’’ She develops
the late social theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus/field to
explicitly incorporate an ecological approach in the ‘‘ecological
habitus.’’ According to Bourdieu, field refers to the always existing,
obligatory boundaries of experiential context: ‘‘a relational config-
uration endowed with a specific gravity which it imposes on all the
objects and agents which enter it’’ (Bourdieu, cited inWidick, 2003, p.
684). Fields allow and demand certain responses repeatedly over time
to the point of habituation; hence ‘‘habitus’’ is the collective term for
this array of dispositions. The habitus thus signifies not just how we
think about the world but embodied articulations (Bourdieu, 1977, p.
85–87). The habitus is both thoroughly individualized and the re-
flection of a shared cultural context.
Habitus also reflects both agency and structural determinacy: the
body’s ways are forever a constitutive response to already existing
social conditions, but they are also generative. The habitus engenders
countless practices, which, as they reverberate in specific fields of
action, reconstitute those fields in novel ways because there are al-
ways gaps of indeterminancy—unintended consequences flow from
unacknowledged conditions. For Bourdieu, habitus does not simply
read off and reproduce practices from social structure, but neither
does it succumb to a ‘‘fetishization of the indeterminacy of social
structures’’ (McNay, 1999, p. 105). The habitus/field combination
amounts to ‘‘an open system of dispositions that is constantly sub-
jected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a
way that either reinforces or modifies its structures’’ (Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992, p. 133).
Kasper’s ecological habitus is defined as the
. ecologically relevant aspects of habitus. Everybody, whether
aware of it or not, lives in, depends on, affects, and is affected by
their ecosystem and the wider biosphere. Certain characteristics of
habitus will be more relevant to those contexts, in whatever ways,
than others. (Kasper, 2009, p. 9; see also Haluza-DeLay, 2007;
Smith, 2001)
Kasper introduces a continuum between ‘‘ecologically supportive’’
and ‘‘ecologically antagonistic’’ lifestyle patterns. Important for her is
the potential of the model to focus on relational process, between
social, group, and personal elements of a life that contribute toward a
position somewhere on that continuum. Kasper’s empirical hopes for
the model lie in its ability to identify nexuses of relationships and
practices that foster a more or less ecologically supportive habitus,
practices reciprocally embedded and embodied in the ‘‘field’’ of lo-
calized social and cultural configurations (e.g., distance from work,
means of travel, shopping centers, leisure) and the broader context
(e.g., advertising, consumerism).
One way of researching ecological habitus in practice is the study
of environmental ‘‘success stories,’’ as they may offer clues as to the
relation set of practices that foster ‘‘strong’’ sustainable lifestyles:
those that can offer a meaningful challenge to obdurate social norms
and practices considered central to ecological degradation, from
overconsumption to privatism. Intentional communities such as
‘‘ecovillages’’ provide an example of such a phenomenon, one that
Kasper has studied empirically (2008). Here the level of analysis is not
the individual but the set of practices that stitch together everyday
practices in a meaningful cultural, personal (including embodiment
and affect), and natural context. Perhaps there is the potential here to
address more explicitly the importance of cultural validation for
behavioral solutions to environmental problems.
Working ecovillages are argued by Kasper to provide a context in
which the relationship between psychological, ecological, social, and
spiritual dimensions of existence are sustained through everyday
practices. These practices are manifest in regular meetings and the
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setting of rules which provide strong social reinforcement; the
availability of information, from the technological to the philo-
sophical, and the freeing up of time to make accessing that infor-
mation possible; the close proximity of a relatively small number of
people; the preservation of green space and maximization of pe-
destrian space within the ecovillage. According to one ecovillage
resident, this organization reflects the realization on the part of
burnt-out environmental activists that ‘‘information is not the place
to start.the problems stem from a deeper source—how they [people]
experience themselves in the world’ (cited in Kasper, 2008, p. 20).
Such a description speaks to the emphasis Kasper, and Bourdieu
before her, place on the ‘‘deeper’’ and literal embodiment of prob-
lematic social practices.
In this framework, the environmental movement becomes im-
portant in the extent to which it can provide a ‘‘field’’ for developing
alternative habitus via experiential/learning processes. It is in this
sense that ‘‘ecovillages reflect [the] capacity to bring about change
via the interaction of particular ways of thinking, perceiving, and
doing on a daily basis.they seem to encourage the development of a
particular type of ecological habitus’’ (Kasper, 2009). Ecological
habitus therefore has relevance to ecopsychology as a way of both
conceptualizing the intertwining of the psychological and the social
and, potentially, predicting which psychosocial configurations are
likely to engender ‘‘strong’’ sustainability.
Articulating the Space of Interrelated Practices
David Kidner’s account of the enmeshing of psyche, nature, and
culture is another vital contribution here (2001), particularly as he
pays much more attention to the vital role of far-reaching social and
cultural frames for the maintenance of environmentally destructive
behavior and the development of viable alternatives. He argues that
meaningful sites of transpersonal relationality are ‘‘ideologically
occluded’’ in industrialized society, and he consistently asserts that it
is this ‘‘space’’ that needs to be reclaimed. The industrialized indi-
vidual is not lacking in terms of an ‘‘inner emptiness,’’ then, but rather
an affective relational extension. What is at stake for Kidner is no less
than the development of cultural forms that can articulate and val-
idate what is referred to with various borrowing from psychological
theories as the ‘‘felt’’ or ‘‘somatic sense,’’ ‘‘preconscious recognition,’’
or the ‘‘unthought known’’ of human/nonhuman nature connected-
ness (Bollas, 1987). What we need, simply put, ‘‘is a way of talking
and thinking about the world that effectively expresses our felt
connection to the world.nurtured and supported by a sympathetic
cultural frame’’ (Kidner, 2001, p. 255). For Kidner, existing articu-
lations of a space of ‘‘reciprocal permeation’’ are understandably
opaque and can feel insubstantial as they are as yet ‘‘materially un-
realized’’ by a supportive cultural framework. Here we connect di-
rectly to sociological arguments and an underdeveloped theme of
ecopsychology—the possibility of culturally validating practices of
human-nature connectedness as a ‘‘solution’’ to environmental
problems.
One way in which such practices have been approached concretely
is the study of ‘‘trans-species dialogue.’’ Kidner noted in 2001 that the
‘‘discontinuity between the ‘animal’ and ‘human’ realms is beginning
to come under fire’’ (p. 94), and in the years since feminist scholars in
particular have turned their attention to trans-species dialogue, de-
fined as ‘‘material and emotional connections to nonhuman species’’
(Potts, 2010). The greatest potential here lies not in the empirical
verification of the outcomes for humanwell-being of animal-assisted
therapies but in a consideration of the relational processes between
human and nonhuman others that constitutes what is felt as con-
nectedness. A good example of this potential is Dulce M. Garcia’s
account of equine-facilitated learning in this journal (2010). She
considers neglected dimensions of equine-facilitated learning which
take us ‘‘towards a new ecology,’’ and her points of emphasis echo
closely the importance of the relational space between, rather than
the separateness (or potential for ontological collapse) of, the
‘‘things’’ involved. She builds on research findings that indicate that
equine-facilitated activities induce positive states of mind and in-
crease ecological awareness. While the clinical psychological focus
on change has been productive, Garcia is more interested in the ‘‘vast
potential’’ of the communication dimension between horses and
humans. She makes only tentative claims about the role horses play
in constructing shared systems of meaning with and between hu-
mans; but she implies that the reciprocal permeation involved in
‘‘horse-human conversations,’’ to borrow Kidner’s phrase, is one way
in which a human/nonhuman connectedness can be articulated.
Horse-human communication may be defined as non/preverbal,
forcing humans to access a way of speaking and using language that
is unfamiliar and archaic.Archaic is here taken, following Berman, to
mean the ‘‘notion that in a literal or figurative sense, everything in
the universe is alive and interrelated, and that we know the world
through direct identification with it, or immersion in its phenomena
(subject/object merger)’’ (Berman, 1981; Garcia, 2010, p. 87). Ac-
counts, and of course experiences, of horse-human relationships
thus provide us with one example of reciprocity between human/
nonhuman nature which could be meaningfully articulated cultur-
ally (for a similar discussion in relation to humans and bird life see
Dickinson, 2010). These non/preverbal and archaic means of com-
munication come closer to Kahn et al.’s ambition of developing a
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‘‘nature language’’: ‘‘a way of speaking about patterns of interactions
between humans and nature and their wide range of instantiations,
and the meaningful, deep, and often joyful feelings that they en-
gender’’ (2010, p. 59).
Garcia’s focus potentially fleshes out precisely the relational ele-
ment of one of the possible interaction patterns noted, but not de-
veloped, by Kahn et al.—‘‘recognition by a nonhuman other’’—not
only in terms of the clinically measurable change it may engender in
those humans involved but in terms of a socially and culturally
meaningful articulation of a relationship, pointing toward alterna-
tive forms of communication. Preverbal dialogue between horses and
humans is of course just one aspect of the relational space between
human and nonhuman nature. While a fascinating example of a step
toward an ‘‘ecopsychology that will find within language an accurate
articulation of the human-nature relationship’’ (Greenway, 2009, p.
50), further developments are needed to understand how such con-
versations could on the one hand coalesce in ways which might prize
us away from our existing ways of life and the obdurate material and
symbolic infrastructures underpinning them and at the same time
become meaningfully articulated and validated within alternative
cultural frameworks.
Conclusion
There is limited scope in reaffirming the connection between na-
ture and subjective or objective measures of well-being in experi-
mental settings, particularly if that connection, or lack of it, is
symptomatic of something else—everyday social practices. Ecopsy-
chology could instead be at the forefront of conceptualizing indi-
vidual human and nonhuman nature relatedness as embedded in
lifestyle webs of sociocultural praxis, often taken for granted (Kasper,
2009). Those of a sociological bent will not be too surprised by the
emphasis on social and cultural context and practices, though it is a
timely reminder that such an emphasis does not require a slide into
social constructionist nihilism or relativism when it comes to nature
(Kidner, 2001). If we accept social practices as our basic unit of con-
cern, we are addressing in a pragmatic way calls to occupy the space of
processes and becoming, rather than the reproduction of obsolete
dualism pitting individuals against nature, society, culture or each
other. It may also continue Andy Fisher’s attempts ‘‘to encourage the
field to become more comprehensive and critical’’ (2002, p. xiii).
What makes us carry on with some social practices and not others;
what makes us defect and be recruited to alternatives? This is a
question that requires an understanding of affective investments that
exceeds some of the developments outlined here (Lertzman, 2012;
Widick, 2003). However, Elizabeth Shove rightly asserts that in the
domain of environmentalism, the study of social practices as the
interconnection of psyche and the social is an area ‘‘positively fizzing
with potential’’ (2010, p. 283). It is also one in which ecopsychology is
well positioned to draw from and contribute.
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